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This paper studies a small open economy with a large external debt. It
begins by considering the long-term effects of shocks in the international
capital market and domestic fiscal policy on the amount of outstanding
external debt and the domestic reallocation of resources between the tradable
and non-tradable goods sectors theoretically. Then, numerical examples on
various shocks are illustrated to help understand those theoretical predic-
tions. For example, an exogenous increase in government expenditures,
together with an increase in the external borrowing rate, requires resource
reallocation between the tradable goods sector and the non-tradable goods
sector as well as a small amount of external borrowings to shift toward the
new stationary equilibrium, whose welfare level worsens. 
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DO NOT REPRINT OR REPRODUCE WITHOUT PERMISSION.I. Introduction
Discussions of the sound macroeconomic policy management and optimal exchange
rate regimes under the free flow of capital have been intensifying since global capital
flows became increasingly active from the 1990s.
1 Amid these developments, evalua-
tions of the Argentine currency board system, which attracted a great deal of attention
from the early 1990s as a hard-peg experiment under the free flow of capital, seem to
have been greatly revised.
2
Specifically, Argentina overcame the effects of the Mexican currency crisis to achieve
high growth rates of 5.5 percent in 1996, 8.1 percent in 1997, and 3.9 percent in 1998,
and through that time the belief that this economic success was partially thanks to the
currency board system became widespread. During the high economic growth years
from 1993 through 1998, however, Argentina’s public-sector government debt to GDP
ratio shot up by 12 percentage points to 40 percent in 1998. Moreover, Argentina’s
unemployment rate has remained close to 20 percent ever since 1995, with few signs
of any lasting improvement.
3 Ultimately, in 2002 Argentina was forced to abandon the
currency board system. From this Argentine experience, it is often understood that
when sound fiscal policy is not maintained, even hard pegs fail to function under the
free flow of capital.
4
For example, Mussa (2002) says the essence of the Argentine crisis was that loose
fiscal policy led to the default on the nation’s external debt and to the collapse of 
its financial markets and economy. A growing cumulative government deficit will
inevitably lead to tragic consequences eventually, regardless of which exchange rate
system is followed. Corden (2002) argues that Argentina’s fatal error was the failure
to slash government expenditures while the economy was still favorable, which he
considers as a prerequisite to a viable currency board system.
Based on these lessons, discussions have begun appearing in academic circles 
regarding the type of fiscal policy that would make a fixed exchange rate system 
sustainable. In particular, these have included reexaminations of sudden stops of
international capital inflows,
5 and of the types of fiscal policies that lead to them.
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1. The debate on whether the liberalization of capital accounts during the 1990s itself was beneficial or not is also 
continuing (see, for example, Rodrik [1998]). (For the most recent research developments, see Eichengreen [2001].)
2. Discussions on the choice of exchange rate system, centered around the merits and demerits of dollarization in
Argentina and elsewhere in the Americas, lie beyond the scope of this paper. For an excellent review of this field,
see Corbo (2002). Also, see Fujiki and Otani (2002) for the recent developments regarding exchange rate systems
and regional currency blocs in the Americas, Europe, and East Asia. 
3. For example, Mussa (2002), who was then serving as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Chief Economist,
reviewed Argentina’s economic performance following the Mexican currency crisis and concluded (1) that the 
currency board system, which he and other IMF staff were somewhat skeptical about when it was introduced, was
in fact effective, but (2) that the failure to significantly reduce the annual fiscal deficit despite the vigorous 
economic growth following the Mexican currency crisis and the subsequent ongoing increase in the consolidated
government deficit were cause for concern. 
4. Some stress that the diminished competitiveness of Argentine export goods following the Brazilian crisis was one
cause of the Argentine crisis (see, for example, Feldstein [2002] and Perry and Servén [2002]). These authors 
conclude that nations should consider the exchange rate systems of their key trading partners when selecting their
own exchange rate systems. 
5. Some believe that it was the substantial reductions in external capital inflows more than the loose fiscal policy 
that had the gravest effects on the Argentine economy. For example, Calvo et al. (2002) state that as a result of 
the continuous rapid decrease of external capital inflows into Argentina from 1998: (1) because tradable goods
account for only a small percentage of the Argentine economy, the decrease in external capital inflows itselfFor example, Calvo (2002) explicates the relationship between fiscal policy and
the sudden stop of capital inflows in an open economy utilizing an endogenous 
economic growth model. This model posits an economy where capital is the only 
factor of production, where production follows a linear production function, and
where the government levies distortional taxes on tradable goods and pays its external
debt. This economy has “good” and “bad” equilibriums—positive economic growth
accompanied by the inflow of foreign capital, and zero economic growth with no
inflow of foreign capital. The coordination among foreign investors determines
which of these two equilibriums is chosen. Normally, the first “good” equilibrium
with positive economic growth and influxes of foreign capital is chosen. Under this
model, when a shock occurs, for example, because hidden government debts are 
discovered or because the government debt balloons for some other reason, the real
exchange rate appreciates, capital inflows stop, and the economy flips over to the zero
economic growth “bad” equilibrium.
Similarly, while the leading analyses of the East Asian currency crisis have generally
focused on the moral hazard issue (see, for example, Corsetti et al. [1999], Krugman
[1998], and Schneider and Tornell [2003]), or on the relationship between liquidity
provision, the exchange rate system, and the banking crisis (see, for example, Chang
and Velasco [2000, 2001]),
6papers emphasizing the effects of fiscal policy have recently
appeared in various contexts. 
For example, Burnside et al. (2001) state that the recognition of an implicit 
government debt guarantee for financial institutions may lead to an upward revision 
of private-sector expectations concerning the amount of future government deficits.
They argue that to cover these future deficits, the government will have to (1) devalue
its own currency to reduce the nominal debt, (2) garner seigniorage from issuing 
currency, or (3) have inflation tax, and that once expectations regarding the future tax
collection spread among agents, this will result in an attack on the currency, regardless
of which option is selected.
7
Calvo (2002) and Burnside et al. (2001) use single-good models to analyze these
types of capital inflows and the relationship between the current account balance and
fiscal policy. When analyzing the effects of fiscal policy on the domestic economy and
on capital inflows, however, it would be preferable and more useful to make a distinc-
tion between tradable and non-tradable goods. This is because it is appropriate to
assume that the goods that may be used as “international collateral” as defined by
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001a)—that is to say, the goods that may be allocated
for external borrowings and interest payments—are limited to tradable items that are
23
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demanded a major change in the real foreign exchange rate to reduce imports; (2) because the debt was dollar
denominated, the changes in the real foreign exchange rate amplified the balance-sheet effect at enterprises 
and financial institutions; and (3) because the dollar-denominated debt was massive, the decrease in the exchange
rate effectively expanded the external debt measured in domestic currency, to the point that repayment became
impossible. They therefore conclude that the cessation of external capital inflows may have been more important
than the government budget deficit.
6. Hattori (2002) combines these two viewpoints, considers two different cases—the one when a nation that has no
problems with its long-term external debt repayment capacity temporarily falls into a liquidity crisis, and the other
where the extent of a currency crisis is more severe than what may be explained by the economic fundamentals—
and discusses the effects and necessity of emergency liquidity provision when currency crises occur. 
7. Here, the cause of the crisis is the future government debt, and there is no increase in the present government debt
as under the first-generation currency crisis models pioneered by Krugman (1979).convertible assets on the international market. And if that is the case, then the ability
to maintain the production of tradable goods should be viewed as the most important
factor when evaluating the capacity to service external debt. 
Moreover, from the perspective of crisis prevention, it would also be beneficial to
deepen our understanding of what kinds of changes in the resource allocations between
the tradable and non-tradable goods sectors occur in nations where crises have yet to
emerge, but which have vast external debts and where there are concerns regarding a
possible currency crisis accompanying changes in capital market conditions.
8
Many analyses using two-sector economic models have already been conducted
on the reduction of external debt in a small open economy and the accompanying
reallocation of resources between the tradable and non-tradable goods sectors, and on
the role of government expenditures, as summarized in Turnovsky (1997), chapter
4.1. In our paper, we use this type of model to investigate the relationship between
the currency crises and fiscal policy in an attempt to apply the model to more 
present-day issues.
Specifically, we utilize an expanded version of the model presented in Turnovsky
(1997), chapter 4.2. Following Bhandari et al. (1990), we add the following assump-
tions to make the Turnovsky (1997) model more realistic. First, because the sovereign
risk premium increases along with increases in the outstanding external debt, the 
borrowing from international capital markets does not ensure consumption smooth-
ing over time. Second, nations with external debts must produce tradable goods 
to repay these debts with interest.
9 We then consider the reallocation of domestic
economy resources demanded by changes in the international capital market, such 
as increases in world interest rates and in the sovereign premium. In addition, 
we consider the cases where government expenditures increase, and when the 
productivity of the tradable goods production sector declines.
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8. In fact, two-sector models are being used in some recent analyses of currency crises. For example, Schneider and
Tornell (2003) use a tradable goods/non-tradable goods two-sector model to consider how the balance-sheet effect
from borrowings from overseas investors influences the real economy. Under their model, a tradable goods 
production enterprise is in a perfect capital market with fixed tradable goods prices. This enterprise uses tradable
goods and labor to produce tradable goods, and fulfills the terms of its loan agreements without fail. Meanwhile, a
non-tradable goods production company produces non-tradable goods by borrowing in domestic currency (for
non-tradable goods) and in foreign currency (for tradable goods). This model assumes that non-tradable goods are
needed for the production of non-tradable goods. The economy randomly experiences booms and recessions, and
the real foreign exchange rate fluctuates. The entrepreneur running the non-tradable goods production company
increases borrowings in expectation of good times, the boom arrives as expected, and the production volumes and
the price of the non-tradable goods (which is the reciprocal of the real foreign-exchange rate) both rise. Suppose
the government provides a debt guarantee to the non-tradable goods production company. If this company
expects a recession and a decline in the real foreign exchange rate, the company increases its foreign currency-
denominated (tradable goods) borrowings and intentionally fails to reduce its foreign currency debt burden despite
a decline in its foreign currency income in an effort to increase the likelihood of bankruptcy. Since the govern-
ment is providing debt guarantees that cover the foreign investors, the firm’s best option is to continue promoting
investment from overseas. When the recession actually arrives and the real exchange rate declines, the large 
overseas borrowings are amplified by the balance sheet effect, the firm goes bankrupt, and the economy falls into
an equilibrium from which it is difficult to recover. Schneider and Tornell (2003) emphasize the influence of
implicit government debt guarantees in the non-tradable goods boom and bust cycle via the balance-sheet effect
from external borrowings and the production of non-tradable goods using non-tradable goods. In contrast, our
paper focuses on the changes in resource allocation in the domestic economy in the long run following an external
shock, rather than explicating the boom and bust cycle and the reasons why crises emerge. 
9. Turnovsky (1997) himself states that analyses based on the additional Bhandari et al. (1990) assumptions are 
possible, but does not provide any numerical examples.Based on the theoretical model, we numerically illustrate the changes in the
resource allocation in nations with large external debts hit by shocks. For example,
consider an exogenous increase in wasteful government expenditures, such as those
under inefficient government spending characterized by loose expenditures on non-
tradable goods, resulting in a higher risk premium and cost of funds. The long-term
equilibrium before and after the shocks demonstrates that unlimited funds at a con-
stant world interest rate are no longer provided from the international capital market
and that a reallocation of resources between the tradable goods and non-tradable
goods sectors becomes necessary.
10
Obviously, the appropriateness of the description “inefficient government spending
characterized by loose expenditures on non-tradable goods” in countries where 
currency crises emerge, assumed for the analyses herein, varies from country to 
country. Regardless, at the very least, as summarized by Tommasi et al. (2001), this
description does approximate the characteristics of Argentina’s fiscal policy during 
the period under consideration. Specifically, Argentina’s constitution only gives the
national authorities exclusive competence over areas associated with defense and 
foreign affairs. The areas of economics and social infrastructures lie under the joint
authority of the central and provincial governments, but the provincial governments
are solely responsible for primary education and local services. As a result, the provin-
cial governments bear about half of consolidated government expenses. Meanwhile, the
provincial governments, which historically do not have strong tax-collection abilities,
delegate much of this work to the central government, and about 80 percent of all 
tax revenues are collected by the central government. Because of this, the central 
government has to transfer tax revenues to the provincial governments, in accordance
with their expenditures. Under this system, even when economic conditions are 
favorable, the provincial governments tend to increase their expenditures out of 
fear that transfers from the central government may decline in the future. For example,
an increase in public servant personnel expenses was reportedly responsible for the 
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10. This paper takes the position that given the actual conditions whereby the insurance function of the free capital
market is limited, the type of policy that the debtor nations themselves should follow over the middle to long
term to avoid a crisis is an important issue. On the other hand, Caballero (2003) asserts that the debt restructur-
ing process led by the IMF is only directly beneficial to countries that are expected to fall into bankruptcy, and
that for the many other nations it is far more important for the private and public sectors to diversify the class of
assets circulated in the world debt market and enhance the risk reallocation function of the international capital
market. This type of analysis on the insurance function of the international capital market is certainly important,
but it lies beyond the scope of this paper.
11. It is well known that as a result of the Argentine government reforms under the Menem Administration (1990–95),
the number of central government public servants declined from 870,000 in 1989 to 180,000 in 1994. Over this
same period, however, the number of provincial government public servants remained essentially unchanged 
at around 1.1 million. Thus, it seems that the Menem Administration reforms were limited to the central 
government. Additionally, under the Menem Administration, central government expenditures on transfers to
provincial governments doubled, and those funds that the government transfers on a discretionary basis were 
allocated not so much to urban areas with high unemployment but more to relatively poor areas where the ruling
party enjoyed strong support. Central government transfers covered 43 percent of the provincial government 
budgets in urbanized regions, compared with 78 percent in rural regions (Gibson and Calvo [1997]).Our analyses proceed as follows. Section II presents the theoretical model, 
and derives the stationary equilibrium. Section III confirms the effects on the station-
ary equilibrium from changes in exogenous variables. Section IV summarizes the 
analytical conclusions, and the detailed mathematical explications are presented in
the Appendix.
II. Open Economy Model
This section introduces our open economy model. We follow Bhandari et al. (1990)
in expanding the two-sector model presented in chapter 4.2 of Turnovsky (1997) to
explicitly assume that the risk premium rises along with increases in the amount of
external debt outstanding.
In this economy, there is a representative household that produces and consumes
tradable and non-tradable goods (this representative household is referred to as “the
consumer” hereinafter), the government, and foreign investors. At each point in time,
the consumer makes decisions on his/her production volumes, consumption volumes,
and capital accumulation (investment) based on given relative goods prices and 
interest rates for borrowings from the foreign investors. The non-tradable goods are
consumed domestically, but are utilized as investment goods. The tradable goods are
consumed domestically or exported.
12
By trading bonds on international capital markets at each point in time, the 
consumer can conclude borrowing contracts with foreign investors. The bonds are
issued based on tradable goods, and non-tradable goods cannot be used as backing 
for international capital borrowings. This assumption that only tradable goods can 
be used captures the concept of “international collateral” defined by Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2001a), which means the goods that may be used for international
borrowings. The foreign investors who provide loans to this country’s consumers form
a group, and offer funds at a common interest rate, which is the world interest rate plus
a risk premium set in accordance with the conditions of the country’s external debt.
Finally, the government collects a lump-sum tax from the consumers, and uses this tax
revenue to purchase both tradable and non-tradable goods.
The following analyses assume that the country is a net debtor to focus on the
overseas debt adjustment process. The prices of tradable goods are determined by the
international goods market, and are given for this country. By selecting the volume
units, the prices of the tradable goods are normalized at one, and the prices of the
non-tradable goods at q. The outline of the model is explained mathematically here,
and a more detailed discussion is presented in the Appendix.
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12. One could also posit the investment goods as tradable goods, but in that case, unless the adjustment cost of
investment is introduced, since tradable goods prices are fixed on overseas markets, the capital stock would be
instantly adjusted and the dynamics we are interested in would not emerge. Alternatively, when non-tradable
goods are used as tradable goods, since costs are incurred in increasing the production of non-tradable goods, the
capital accumulation dynamics do emerge even without the investment adjustment costs. See chapter 4.1 of
Turnovsky (1997) for a detailed review of the relevant literature.A. Consumer







Here,  indicates the subjective discount rate,C is the goods consumption volume,
and the superscripts [(i = T, N ); the same hereafter] indicate tradable goods and
non-tradable goods, respectively. The subscript letter t expresses the time.









Here Y is the production volume, K is the amount of capital, and L shows the labor
input. The production functions for both sectors are homogeneous of degree 1.
There is no depreciation in capital stock, so all investment represents an increase
in capital stock,




Here K is the total amount of capital in this economy, K
.
is the time differential 
of capital K (hereafter the time differential is expressed by the symbol .), and I is 





There is no population growth, and the working population L – is allocated to the
two sectors in accordance with the following equation.




The government collects a lump-sum tax T from the consumer, and uses this tax 
revenue to purchase both tradable and non-tradable goods. For simplification, 
assuming a balanced-budget fiscal policy, the government budget constraint can be
written as follows.
G
T + q •G
N =T.
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13. In models that assume capital depreciation, the long-term equilibrium investment only corresponds to the 
depreciation of capital stock. Therefore, the assumption of no capital depreciation adopted here does not have a
large qualitative influence on the following analytical results.Here G
T and G
N express the government expenditures in the tradable goods and
non-tradable goods sectors, respectively. The government expenditures in these 
two sectors are not included in either the utility function or the production function.
In other words, the government consumes a portion of the production without
increasing either productivity or utility, and in this sense the government spending
may be said to be purely wasteful. On the other hand, because the government
expenditures are covered by a lump-sum tax and not a proportional tax on market
prices, the taxation does not result in any price distortion.
C. Overseas Investors
In the international capital market, there is a foreign investors’ group that makes
loans to the consumer in the debtor country at a common interest rate, which is 
set considering the consumer’s external debt repayment capacity (creditworthiness),
collateral, and other risk factors.
Here, for simplification, we assume the foreign investors predict that the default
risk will increase as the cumulative balance of the country’s private-sector external
debt rises, and that their lending rate rises in line with this. Specifically, following
Bhandari et al. (1990), the outstanding external debt is expressed as b (≥ 0) and the
lending rate as rs, which is defined as follows.
rs = rs(b), r′>0, r″>0,   (b ≥ 0). (1) 
The following model also assumes that all of the borrowings are private-sector
debt. Incidentally, according to Perry and Servén (2002), as shown on the second 
column of Table 1, in Argentina the ratio of external debt to GDP shot up from 
27.7 percent in 1993 to 58.3 percent in 2001. And as shown in the third and 
fourth columns of the table, the ratio for the private sector rose from 5.6 percent to
25.1 percent during this same period. Also, while the consolidated government debt
remained basically flat over 1999–2001, which was the term just prior to the crisis,
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Table 1  External Debt of Argentina
Percentage of GDP
Year Total Consolidated Nonfinancial private 
government debt and financial debt
1993 27.7 22.1 5.6
1994 29.6 23.5 6.1
1995 39.0 26.8 12.1
1996 41.8 27.3 14.5
1997 44.8 28.2 16.6
1998 48.6 30.5 18.0
1999 53.6 33.2 20.4
2000 54.0 33.9 20.1
2001 58.3 33.2 25.1
Source: Perry and Servén (2002), p. 47, table 4.5.the weight of the private-sector borrowings increased. Accordingly, we can easily
adopt the assumption that focusing only on the private-sector debt is appropriate as
an approximation for the period just prior to the crisis.
14
D. Consumer Optimization 
The consumer owns enterprises, provides them with capital and labor, receives wages
from them, and has claims on their profits. He also purchases the investment goods
required for future capital accumulation in future periods.
Each period, the consumer repays the principal and interest on the previous
period’s borrowings and arranges the current period’s borrowings from the inter-
national capital market. Because the outstanding balance of external debt is positive,
the budget constraint equation has the opposite sign to the usual, as follows.
b
.
t = rdt • bt − (Yt
T − Ct
T) − qt (Yt
N − Ct
N) + qt • It + Tt.
Here, rd is the borrowing rate on the international money market, which is given for
the consumer. The consumer determines his investment, production, and consump-
tion plans over time to maximize his utility function, so the dynamic optimization














subject to  b
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t = rdt • bt +Ct
T + qt •Ct
N + qt •It + Tt − Yt














L – = Lt
T + Lt
N.
The current value Hamiltonian for this equation is defined as follows.
H = U(C
T, C
N) +  1{Y
T + q • Y
N − C
T − q • C
N − q • I − T − rd • b}
+  2 • I +  3(K − K
T − K
N) +  4(L – − L
T − L
N),
where  1,  2,  3, and  4 are Lagrangean multipliers.
The first-order conditions for this optimization problem are 
 U 1      U —— = — • ——  =  1, 
 C
T q  C
N
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14. Perry and Servén (2002) point out that from 1998 the volume of domestic bonds issued by the government of
Argentina increased while the volume of external bonds issued remained flat, and that a large percentage of 
the domestic bonds were held by domestic financial institutions. This implies that the external borrowings by the
private sector during this period were not so much to maintain the level of private-sector consumption but rather
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1 =  1{  − rd}, 
lim 1t • bt • e
−rt = 0   (non-Ponzi game condition), 
t→ 
lim 3t • Kt • e
−rt = 0   (transversality condition), 
t→ 
where k
i (i = T, N ) expresses that capital-labor ratio.
E. Stationary Equilibrium 







= q . = 0.
In other words, the instantaneous marginal utility of wealth at each period, 
which is the Lagrangean multiplier for each period’s budget constraint equation, the
outstanding external debt, capital, and the price of non-tradable goods all remain 
constant over time.
The equilibrium condition in the international capital market should be the 
following equation.
rd = rs(b) ≡ r(b).
From the first-order conditions of the consumer’s optimization and the equilibrium
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T + q* • G
N = T, (9)
where the superscript asterisks denote the values taken at the stationary equilibrium.
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tradable goods. Equation (3) shows the equalization of the subjective discount rate
and the interest rate on external borrowings as well as the equalization of the interest
rate on external borrowings and the marginal productivity of capital in the tradable
and non-tradable goods sectors. Equation (4) is the equalization for the marginal
productivity of labor in both production sectors. Equations (5) and (6) are market
clearing conditions for the capital and labor markets. Equations (7) and (8) are 
market clearing conditions for the tradable goods and non-tradable goods markets.
Finally, equation (9) is the government budget constraint.
From the first equal sign of equation (3), in this economy the subjective discount
rate is equal to the external borrowings interest rate, which determines the amount of
external debt. From the next equal sign, the marginal productivity of capital is also
equal to the external borrowing rate, which also determines a common capital-labor
ratio in both sectors. Combining the third equal sign in equation (3) with equation
(4) determines the capital-labor ratio in the tradable goods sector as well as the 
non-tradable goods price q*(the long-run equilibrium price for non-tradable goods,
namely, the real exchange rate).
Equations (7)–(9) indicate that the effect of government expenditures on the 
production volume of each sector varies depending on the amounts directed to the
tradable goods and non-tradable goods sectors. Finally, because capital accumulation
has finished under this stationary equilibrium, the investment is zero.
F. Discussion of the Stationary Equilibrium and of the Effect from Expanding
Government Expenditures
From equation (3), the distinctive characteristics of this stationary equilibrium are
that the external borrowings interest rate determines the outstanding debt, and that
this interest rate is also equal to the marginal productivity of capital. Moreover, the
external borrowings interest rate in turn ensures that the capital-labor ratios in the
tradable and non-tradable goods sectors remain equal. Additionally, the non-tradable
goods prices are set by equation (4). 
In this stationary equilibrium, increases in exogenous demand from an expansion
of government expenditures should necessitate adjustments such as a reduction in 
private-sector consumption or an increase in the production volume at a constant price. 
In a stationary equilibrium, because the capital-labor ratios remain equal, adjust-
ments to the production volumes of tradable and non-tradable goods occur via 
inter-sectoral adjustments in labor and capital inputs. Specifically, since adjustments
in production volumes in reaction to an increase (or decrease) in the demand for
goods occur via the transfer of labor and capital between the two production sectors,
in cases where there are structural or systematic hindrances to the reallocation of
labor and/or capital, this should imply a growing risk of failure to produce a 
sufficient volume of tradable goods to repay the external debt. 
And during this period, the outstanding external debt remains unchanged because
it is fixed by the external borrowings interest rate. 
It may seem strange that under a long-run equilibrium an exogenous increase in
government expenditures does not result in a rise in the outstanding external debt.
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and may be explained as follows.
If the representative consumer could borrow at a fixed interest rate from the
international capital market regardless of the outstanding external debt, rs would no
longer be dependent on b in equation (1). From equations (2)–(6), the fixed world
interest rate is equal to the subjective discount rate in this stationary equilibrium.
This determines the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods and the 
aggregate capital stock of the economy, so the influence on the outstanding debt 
disappears. Conversely, if government expenditures increase the amount of tradable
goods, the only variable that may change in equations (7)–(9) is the external borrow-
ings, so while the domestic distribution of resources remains unchanged, the private
sector uses the increased external debt to finance the government expenditures, which
are used for imports. Thus, when access to a free capital market is assumed, the 
outstanding external debt inevitably rises. However, this does not have any effect on
domestic private-sector consumption.
Yet because this paper assumes that the outstanding external debt is adjusted to
equal the subjective discount rate as well as the interest rate paid to foreign investors
(including the risk premium), the route with an increase in the external debt and an
increase in government expenditures is cut off. In other words, the market discipline
apparently prevents covering wasteful government expenditures through an increase
in external borrowings. Conversely, if government expenditures increase without this
type of limitation, this will have an adverse effect on domestic production and on the
consumption schedule.
The argument here is also consistent with that in Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2001b), who note that the theoretical assumption of a free international capital 
market where an unlimited volume of funds may be borrowed at a fixed interest rate,
albeit at a somewhat high interest rate, is sometimes inappropriate. It may be more
important to focus the analysis on the domestic adjustments that occur assuming a
fixed amount for the inflow of foreign capital.
III. Influence on the Long-Term Equilibrium from Changes 
in Exogenous Variables: Numerical Example
In this section, we examine how the values of the endogenous variables under the 
stationary equilibrium derived in the previous chapter are influenced by changes in
exogenous variables. Those changes include changes in the world interest rate, the
foreign investors’ risk premium (marginal increase rate), increases in government
expenditures, and declines in productivity. 
As shown in the Appendix, if tradable goods are gross substitutes for non-tradable
goods, a saddle path exists nearby the equilibrium. Accordingly, we now conduct the
analysis using a numerical example. We first specify the parameters of the production
and utility functions to obtain our benchmark long-run stationary equilibrium. We
then add shocks to the relevant exogenous variables to see how this stationary 
equilibrium shifts to a new equilibrium over the long term. The main features of
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this chapter. 
First, we suppose the following addi-log utility function. 
(Ct
T)





N)= ——— + ———. 
1 −  T 1 −  N
Following Nishiyama (2002), we set the parameters at  T = 1/1.4,  N = 1/4.
Next, we specify the production functions for tradable and non-tradable goods as
the following Cobb-Douglas functions.
F(K, L) = A • K
  • L
1− , 
H(K, L) = K
  • L
1− . 
Because the analytical results are sensitive to the relative size of the factor intensity
of both sectors, we separate the examinations into a capital-intensive tradable goods
sector case (  = 0.3,   = 0.25) and a capital-intensive non-tradable goods sector case
(  = 0.25,   = 0.3). Finally, we approximate the foreign investors’ lending function
as follows by separating the fixed world interest rate r0 from the risk premium.
rs(b) = r0 + r1 • b
2.
The numerical analysis takes the following order. 
First, we set the initial period values as subjective discount rate = 0.03; r0 (world
interest rate) = 0.02; r1 (risk premium parameter) = 0.004; government expenditures
on tradable goods = 0.3; government expenditures on non-tradable goods = 0.3; and
A (productivity parameter) = 1. 
Next we calculate the endogenous variables: external debt, interest rate, interest
payment, non-tradable goods price, capital-labor ratio in the tradable goods sector,
capital-labor ratio in the non-tradable goods sector, labor employment in the tradable
goods sector, labor employment in the non-tradable goods sector, aggregate capital
stock, production volume of tradable goods, production volume of non-tradable
goods, consumption volumes of tradable and non-tradable goods, instantaneous 
utility, and the marginal utility of wealth. Then, to examine the external debt burden,
we calculate the ratio of interest payments to the production volume of tradable
goods, and the ratio of interest plus capital payments to the production volume of
tradable goods. 
Finally we show the characteristic roots of the dynamic equation coefficient
matrix, and the existence of a saddle-point path is confirmed by the presence of two
(real) negative characteristic roots. The stationary equilibrium derived in this manner
serves as a benchmark for the simulations.
Next, we confirm the effects on this equilibrium from changing four exogenous
variables, as follows: (1) increasing the world interest rate from 0.02 to 0.025; 
(2) increasing the risk premium from 0.004 to 0.007; (3) increasing the government
expenditures on tradable goods from 0.3 to 0.5; and (4) increasing the government
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from (5) simultaneously increasing the risk premium and increasing the government
expenditures on non-tradable goods. Finally, we examine the effects on the bench-
mark case and on the results of cases (1) through (5) above from decreasing the 
productivity of the tradable goods sector (a decrease in A from 1 to 0.95). So we 
conduct calculations for 12 different cases under the two scenarios whereby the 
tradable goods sector is capital intensive (  = 0.3,   = 0.25, Table 2) and the non-
tradable goods sector is capital intensive (  = 0.25,   = 0.3, Table 3). In all cases, we
assume that the shock is permanent. The results may be explained as follows.
A. Increase in the World Interest Rate
When the world interest rate rises and all other conditions remain unchanged, the
interest rate on external borrowings rises and thus consumers decrease the outstand-
ing external debt until the interest rate on external borrowings comes to equal the
subjective discount rate. Whether or not the amount of interest payments declines
along with this adjustment in the outstanding external debt depends upon the shape
of the lending rate coefficient. If the outstanding external debt and the interest 
payments both decline, the amount of tradable goods that need to be produced to
cover the interest payments declines along with the decline in the interest payments,
and this is the case presented in Table 2, column 1. In this example, the tradable
goods sector is capital intensive. Labor moves from the tradable goods sector to the
non-tradable goods sector, and the aggregate capital stock, which was being used
intensively in the tradable goods sector, also declines. Moreover, consumption
increases and the utility level rises. On the contrary, if the non-tradable goods 
sector is capital intensive, Table 3, column 2 shows that labor moves from the 
tradable goods sector to the non-tradable goods sector, and the aggregate capital 
stock increases. 
B. Increase in the Risk Premium
Like the effects from an increase in the world interest rate, when the risk premium
rises and all other conditions remain unchanged, the interest rate on external borrow-
ings rises and this prompts the consumers to decrease the outstanding external debt.
15
Here again, any increase or decrease in the amount of interest payments depends on
the size of r1 in the external investors’ lending function. If the tradable goods sector
is capital intensive, the results are presented in Table 2, column 2. When the amount
of interest payments does decline, the amount of tradable goods that need to be 
produced to cover the interest payments decreases, and labor moves from the tradable
goods sector to the non-tradable goods sector. If the non-tradable goods sector is 
capital intensive, Table 3, column 2 shows that labor moves from the tradable goods
sector to the non-tradable goods sector, and the aggregate capital stock increases. 
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15. In fact, as noted by Calvo et al. (2002), from 2001 Argentina’s sovereign spread rose sharply, the influx of external


































































































































Benchmark (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
A 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 –0.0500 –0.0500 –0.0500 –0.0500 –0.0500 –0.0500
r0 0.0200 +0.0050 0 0 0 0 0 +0.0050 0 0 0 0
r1 0.0040 0 +0.0030 0 0 +0.0030 0 0 +0.0030 0 0 +0.0030
G
T 0.3000 0 0 +0.2000 0 0 0 0 0 +0.2000 0 0
G
N 0.3000 0 0 0 +0.1726 +0.1726 0 0 0 0 +0.1816 +0.1816
G
T + qG
N 0.6478 0 0 +0.2000 +0.2000 +0.2000 –0.0174 –0.0174 –0.0174 +0.1826 +0.1826 +0.1826
b* 1.5811 –0.4631 –0.3859 0 0 –0.3859 0 –0.4631 –0.3859 0 0 –0.3859
r* 0.0300 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
r*b* 0.0474 –0.0139 –0.0116 0 0 –0.0116 0 –0.0139 –0.0116 0 0 –0.0116
q* 1.1592 0 0 0 0 0 –0.0580 –0.0580 –0.0580 –0.0580 –0.0580 –0.0580
k
T* 21.7221 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k
N* 16.8950 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
K* 19.5477 –0.0180 –0.0150 +0.2546 –0.1385 –0.1529 –0.0036 –0.0227 –0.0195 +0.2660 –0.1476 –0.1628
L
T* 0.5495 –0.0037 –0.0031 +0.0527 –0.0287 –0.0317 –0.0007 –0.0047 –0.0041 +0.0551 –0.0306 –0.0337
L
N* 0.4505 +0.0037 +0.0031 –0.0527 +0.0287 +0.0317 +0.0007 +0.0047 +0.0041 –0.0551 +0.0306 +0.0337
F(K
T*, L
T*) 1.3838 –0.0094 –0.0079 +0.1328 –0.0722 –0.0798 –0.0019 –0.0119 –0.0102 +0.1388 –0.0770 –0.0849
G(K
N*, L
N*) 0.9133 +0.0076 +0.0063 –0.1069 +0.0582 +0.0642 +0.0015 +0.0096 +0.0082 –0.1117 +0.0620 +0.0684
r*b*/F(K
T*, L
T*) 0.0343 –0.0099 –0.0082 –0.0030 +0.0019 –0.0068 +0.0001 –0.0098 –0.0082 –0.0031 +0.0020 –0.0067
(1 + r*)b*/F(K
T*, L
T*) 1.1769 –0.3390 –0.2822 –0.1031 +0.0648 –0.2328 +0.0016 –0.3375 –0.2806 –0.1073 +0.0694 –0.2291
C
T* 1.0364 +0.0045 +0.0037 –0.0672 –0.0722 –0.0682 –0.0710 –0.0666 –0.0673 –0.1374 –0.1423 –0.1383
C
N* 0.6133 +0.0076 +0.0063 –0.1069 –0.1144 –0.1084 +0.0015 +0.0096 +0.0082 –0.1117 –0.1196 –0.1132
U(C
T*,C
N*) 4.4599 +0.0129 +0.0108 –0.1908 –0.2048 –0.1935 –0.0692 –0.0557 –0.0579 –0.2701 –0.2849 –0.2729
 1* 0.9748 –0.0030 –0.0025 +0.0478 +0.0516 +0.0485 +0.0507 +0.0473 +0.0479 +0.1042 +0.1085 +0.1050
Characteristic roots –1.6123 –1.3759  –1.8415  –1.6193  –1.6082  –1.8367  –1.5862 –1.3552 –1.8111 –1.5872 –1.5854 –1.8101
–0.0496 –0.0492 –0.0505 –0.0449 –0.0450 –0.0459 –0.0439 –0.0436 –0.0447 –0.0392 –0.0389 –0.0397
0.0810 0.0802 0.0816 0.0763 0.0764 0.0769 0.0973 0.0959 0.0982 0.0926 0.0923 0.0932
1.6610 1.4149 1.8904 1.6680 1.6568 1.8856 1.6365 1.3966 1.8613 1.6375 1.6357 1.8603
Note: The shaded variables are the exogenous variables that are hit by shocks. Columns (1)–(11) show the deviations from the benchmark values. The characteristic
roots of the Jacobian matrix in equation (A.10) are evaluated around the new stationary equilibrium after the shocks are given.













































Benchmark (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
A 1.0000 0 0 0 0 0 –0.0500 –0.0500 –0.0500 –0.0500 –0.0500 –0.0500
r0 0.0200 +0.0050 0 0 0 0 0 +0.0050 0 0 0 0
r1 0.0040 0 +0.0030 0 0 +0.0030 0 0 +0.0030 0 0 +0.0030
G
T 0.3000 0 0 +0.2000 0 0 0 0 0 +0.2000 0 0
G
N 0.3000 0 0 0 +0.2343 +0.2343 0 0 0 0 +0.2466 +0.2466
G
T + qG
N 0.5561 0 0 +0.2000 +0.2000 +0.2000 –0.0128 –0.0128 –0.0128 +0.1872 +0.1872 +0.1872
b* 1.5811 –0.4631 –0.3859 0 0 –0.3859 0 –0.4631 –0.3859 0 0 –0.3859
r* 0.0300 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
r*b* 0.0474 –0.0139 –0.0116 0 0 –0.0116 0 –0.0139 –0.0116 0 0 –0.0116
q* 0.8536 0 0 0 0 0 –0.0427 –0.0427 –0.0427 –0.0427 –0.0427 –0.0427
k
T* 20.8654 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k
N* 26.8270 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
K* 23.6575 +0.0285 +0.0238 –0.4021 +0.1449 +0.1678 +0.1145 +0.1438 +0.1389 –0.2994 +0.2558 +0.2794
L
T* 0.5316 –0.0048 –0.0040 +0.0675 –0.0243 –0.0281 –0.0192 –0.0241 –0.0233 +0.0502 –0.0429 –0.0469
L
N* 0.4684 +0.0048 +0.0040 –0.0675 +0.0243 +0.0281 +0.0192 +0.0241 +0.0233 –0.0502 +0.0429 +0.0469
F(K
T*, L
T*) 1.1363 –0.0102 –0.0085 +0.1442 –0.0519 –0.0602 –0.0411 –0.0515 –0.0498 +0.1073 –0.0917 –0.1002
G(K
N*, L
N*) 1.2565 +0.0128 +0.0107 –0.1810 +0.0652 +0.0755 +0.0515 +0.0647 +0.0625 –0.1347 +0.1151 +0.1257
r*b*/F(K
T*, L
T*) 0.0417 –0.0120 –0.0100 –0.0047 +0.0020 –0.0084 +0.0016 –0.0108 –0.0087 –0.0036 +0.0037 –0.0071
(1 + r*)b*/F(K
T*, L
T*) 1.4333 –0.4106 –0.3417 –0.1614 +0.0686 –0.2893 +0.0537 –0.3717 –0.3002 –0.1237 +0.1258 –0.2451
C
T* 0.7888 +0.0037 +0.0031 –0.0558 –0.0519 –0.0486 –0.0411 –0.0376 –0.0382 –0.0927 –0.0917 –0.0886
C
N* 0.9565 +0.0128 +0.0107 –0.1810 –0.1691 –0.1588 +0.0515 +0.0647 +0.0625 –0.1347 –0.1315 –0.1209
U(C
T*,C
N*) 4.5602 +0.0173 +0.0144 –0.2556 –0.2382 –0.2230 +0.0022 +0.0195 +0.0166 –0.2535 –0.2489 –0.2338
 1* 1.1846 –0.0039 –0.0033 +0.0638 +0.0591 +0.0550 +0.0461 +0.0421 +0.0428 +0.1106 +0.1093 +0.1052
Characteristic roots –1.5304 –1.3089 –1.7475 –1.5215 –1.5335 –1.7510 –1.5242 –1.3058 –1.7395 –1.5077 –1.5298 –1.7459
–0.0502 –0.0498 –0.0512 –0.0455 –0.0454 –0.0463 –0.0615 –0.0606 –0.0628 –0.0567 –0.0559 –0.0572
0.0818 0.0808 0.0824 0.0770 0.0769 0.0775 0.0728 0.0721 0.0733 0.0681 0.0672 0.0677
1.5789 1.3479 1.7963 1.5699 1.5820 1.7998 1.5708 1.3422 1.7869 1.5542 1.5763 1.7932
Note: The shaded variables are the exogenous variables that are hit by shocks. Columns (1)–(11) show the deviations from the benchmark values. The characteristic
roots of the Jacobian matrix in equation (A.10) are evaluated around the new stationary equilibrium after the shocks are given.
Table 3  Shock Tests: Capital-Intensive Non-Tradable Goods Sector (  = 0.25,   = 0.3)C. Increases in Government Expenditures
The effects from an increase in government expenditures on a given production sector
should depend on the capital-labor ratio for that sector. Accordingly, the following
examinations cover the cases where the tradable goods sector is capital intensive 
(Table 2) and where the non-tradable goods sector is capital intensive (Table 3).
First, the outstanding external debt is not changed from the initial stationary
equilibrium condition because the outstanding external debt is determined so that
the subjective discount rate and the interest rate on external borrowings are equal.
Accordingly the repayment amount remains unchanged and all increases in govern-
ment expenditures must be covered by increases in the production volume and/or
decreases in consumption. 
When the tradable goods sector is capital intensive, as shown in Table 2, column 3,
an increase in government expenditures on tradable goods increases the production of
tradable goods and decreases the ratio of external debt to tradable goods production.
Conversely, as shown in Table 2, column 4, an increase in government expenditures on
non-tradable goods increases the production of non-tradable goods, necessitating a
shift of labor into the non-tradable goods sector, and thus works to decrease aggregate
capital stock.
Next, when the non-tradable goods sector is capital intensive, as shown in Table 3,
column 4, an increase in government expenditures on tradable goods works to decrease
aggregate capital stock. However, because the production of tradable goods increases,
the ratio of external debt to tradable goods production declines. In contrast, as shown
in Table 3, column 4, an increase in government expenditures on non-tradable goods
works to increase aggregate capital stock.
Suppose that the tradable goods sector is capital intensive. Suppose further that an
increase in government expenditures on non-tradable goods occurs at the same time
as an exogenous increase in the risk premium. As shown in Table 2, column 5, this
leads to economic adjustments whereby aggregate capital stock, the production of
tradable goods and the external debt all contract, and economic welfare is worsened.
D. Decreases in Productivity
Here we examine the case where the tradable goods sector is capital intensive and
undergoes a negative productivity shock.
In this situation there is a transfer of labor to the non-tradable goods sector,
whose productivity has risen on a relative basis, and the production volume of non-
tradable goods increases. Conversely the production volume of the tradable goods
sector decreases, and along with this the tradable goods production volume ratio of
capital plus interest payments rises (as shown in Table 2, column 6). 
As for the causes of the hardships that afflicted Argentina’s economy, some have
noted the worsening terms of trade, especially the decrease in the export competitive-
ness of Argentine goods following the Brazilian crisis (Calvo et al. [2002]). Calvo et al.
find that the external debt problem may be exacerbated under such conditions. As
shown in Table 2, column 10, the analyses in this paper indicate that when the pro-
ductivity of the export sector declines while government expenditures on non-tradable
goods increase, the ratio of interest payments to tradable goods production and the
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the outstanding external debt remains unchanged.
Table 2, column 11 shows the case where government expenditures on non-
tradable goods increase under these conditions while the risk premium also rises. 
In this case, the tradable goods sector contracts, the price of non-tradable goods
drops, and the outstanding external debt decreases. The instantaneous utility level
also declines. 
The case where the non-tradable goods sector is capital intensive is summarized in
Table 3, columns 6–11. Labor moves into the non-tradable goods sector because its 
relative productivity has risen, and the production volume of non-tradable goods rises.
The aggregate capital stock increases when the government expenditure on non-
tradable goods increases (Table 3, column 6). Another possibility (Table 3, column 11)
is the case where the government expenditure on non-tradable goods increases 
while the risk premium also rises. In this case the tradable goods sector contracts, the
prices of non-tradable goods decline, the outstanding external debt drops, and the
instantaneous utility level decreases, but the aggregate capital stock increases.
E. Notes Regarding the Short-Term Effects
This model has four variables; however, as can be seen in the Appendix, follow-
ing Bhandari et al. (1990), we can obtain the analytical solutions for the variables
that we are interested in. Thus, this subsection illustrates some of the dynamic 
transition path.
As explained in detail in the Appendix, the dynamic behavior of this model is 
determined by four variables: the marginal utility of wealth, the prices of non-tradable
goods, capital, and the outstanding external debt. The above shock tests assumed that
the shocks are all permanent and perfectly anticipated. Under these assumptions, it
would be reasonable to assume that the marginal utility of wealth and the prices of
non-tradable goods are jump-variables, while the two other variables—capital and the
outstanding external debt—gradually move toward the new equilibrium. 
Hence, let us check the dynamic properties of capital and the outstanding external
debt first, and then examine the transition path of other variables. 
For example, the effects from a rise in the world interest rate (Table 3, column 1,
the non-tradable goods sector is capital intensive) is illustrated in Figure 1 [1]. In the
adjustment process in moving from the initial equilibrium A to the new equilibrium
B, aggregate capital stock declines substantially and then gradually increases to the
new equilibrium level. The outstanding external debt monotonically declines to the
new stationary state. 
The effects from an increase in government expenditures on tradable goods and an
increase in government expenditures on non-tradable goods increases (summarized in
Table 3, columns 3 and 4), are illustrated in Figure 1 [2] and [3]. The long-run levels
of outstanding external debt remain constant between the initial equilibrium A and the
new equilibrium B, since the world interest rate is constant. However, an increase in
government expenditures on tradable goods requires a long-run decrease in aggregate
capital stock and a temporary decline in the outstanding external debt (Figure 1 [2]).
To the contrary, an increase in government expenditures on non-tradable goods leads
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Figure 1  An Example of Short-Run Dynamics






































[1] Increases in the World Interest Rate
[2] Increases in Government Expenditures on Tradable Goods
[3] Increases in Government Expenditures on Non-Tradable Goodsto the long-run increase in aggregate capital stock and a temporary increase in the 
outstanding external debt (Figure 1 [3]). 
Let us see the changes in the other variables. For example, the effects from a rise in
the world interest rate (Table 3, column 1, the non-tradable goods sector is capital
intensive) on the other variables are illustrated in Figure 2. As we have seen in Figure 1,
aggregate capital stock and the outstanding external debt change only gradually move
to the new equilibrium. However, one of the two jump-variables, marginal utility of
wealth, jumps up immediately after the shock, and gradually declines to a new equi-
librium. The price of non-tradable goods falls immediately after the shock, increases
above the level of new equilibrium, and then gradually declines to the new equilibrium
level. The amount of employment in the non-tradable goods sector rises right after the
shock, due to the change of the capital-labor ratios in both production sectors that
reflects the increase of the interest rate and the fall of price of non-tradable goods, and
then gradually converges to the new equilibrium level. Finally, the ratio of interest 
payments to the production volume of tradable goods initially increases and declines
gradually, because the interest rate increases immediately after the shock while the 
outstanding external debt only changes gradually. 
Figure 3 shows the effects of an increase in government expenditures on non-
tradable goods on the important variables we are interested in (Table 3, column 3,
and Figure 1 [3], the non-tradable goods sector is capital intensive). Aggregate capital
stock increases gradually, while the outstanding external debt temporarily increases
and returns to its initial level. In the meantime, one of the two jump-variables, 
marginal utility of wealth, overshoots immediately after the shock, and gradually
declines to a new equilibrium. The price of non-tradable goods increases immediately
after the shock, and returns to its initial level. The amount of employment in the
non-tradable goods sector and the ratio of interest payments to the production 
volume of tradable goods increase gradually.
For the sake of completeness, Figure 4 examines the effects from a rise in the
world interest rate, from an increase in government expenditures on tradable goods,
and from an increase in government expenditures on non-tradable goods increases on
aggregate capital stock and the outstanding external debt under the alternative
assumption that the tradable goods sector is capital intensive. Long-run changes
between the initial equilibrium and new equilibrium are summarized in Table 2,
columns 1, 4, and 5. In the adjustment process in moving from the initial equilib-
rium  A to the new equilibrium B, aggregate capital stock declines substantially, 
and then arrives at the new equilibrium level, as Figure 4 shows. The outstanding
external debt monotonically declines to the new stationary state. The effects from an
increase in government expenditures on tradable goods (or an increase in government
expenditures on non-tradable goods) on aggregate capital stock and the outstanding
external debt are symmetric to the results shown in Figure 1. This is because we
reversed the factor intensities between the non-tradable goods sector and tradable
goods sector. 
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Figure 2  An Adjustment Process of the Variables 
(Non-Tradable Goods Sector; Capital-Intensive, the World Interest Rate;



























Note: The symbol   denotes the point when the shock occurs, and the dark solid
lines indicate the trajectories of endogenous variables in the transition. The
light solid lines correspond to the levels at the stationary equilibrium after the
shock to which the variables converge.



























Note: The symbol   denotes the point when the shock occurs, and the dark solid
lines indicate the trajectories of endogenous variables in the transition. The
light solid lines correspond to the levels at the stationary equilibrium after 
the shock to which the variables converge.
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Figure 3  An Adjustment Process of the Variables
(Non-Tradable Goods Sector; Capital-Intensive, Government Expenditures




























Note: The symbol   denotes the point when the shock occurs, and the dark solid
lines indicate the trajectories of endogenous variables in the transition. The
light solid lines correspond to the levels at the stationary equilibrium after 
the shock to which the variables converge.




























Note: The symbol   denotes the point when the shock occurs, and the dark solid
lines indicate the trajectories of endogenous variables in the transition. The
light solid lines correspond to the levels at the stationary equilibrium after 
the shock to which the variables converge.
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Figure 4  An Example of Short-Run Dynamics




































[1] Increases in the World Interest Rate
[2] Increases in Government Expenditures on Tradable Goods
[3] Increases in Government Expenditures on Non-Tradable GoodsVI. Summary and Outlook
The analyses in this paper can be summarized as follows. When a nation has a large
external debt, and all other conditions are constant, a spendthrift fiscal policy might
cause the risk premium to rise, which might boost the interest rate on overseas 
borrowings simultaneously. In this case, even under a free international capital market,
unlimited external borrowing at a constant world interest rate is not guaranteed, 
and so an active movement of resources between the domestic tradable goods and 
non-tradable goods sectors becomes necessary. 
Especially, if tradable goods alone serve as “international collateral” in the sense of
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001b), and when the tradable goods sector is capital
intensive and a decline in productivity leads to diminished export competitiveness,
then the domestic economy is forced into a major reallocation of resources. 
Furthermore, the analyses in this paper suggest that if there were factors that 
hindered this structural adjustment, the domestic economy could not smoothly move
to a new stationary equilibrium following an exogenous shock, and this could imply
that the economy would then face additional difficulties such as rising unemployment
and idle capital.
16
In this paper, keeping in mind the assertions made in Tomassi et al. (2001), we have
summarized the effects of wasteful government expenditures on economic structural
adjustments via numerical examples. However, the model here does not explicitly
incorporate items that would make this problem even harsher, such as downward wage
rigidity or taxation that distorts the price mechanism because the government has 
only weak tax-collection abilities. Additionally, if Tomassi et al. (2001) have correctly
identified the essence of the Argentine crisis as the growing overall government depen-
dence on external borrowings because the provincial governments pursued their own
short-term interests and did not cooperate with central government efforts to reduce
debt, such crises will not disappear, even with a greater understanding of the movement
of resources among sectors, unless a framework is created whereby the citizens them-
selves voluntarily cooperate with efforts to reduce fiscal expenditures. In this sense, the
discussion is about the income distribution, and needs to transcend conventional
macroeconomics and move into the political realm.
According to Tommasi et al. (2001), the prescription for Argentina emphasized by
economists, the decentralization of microeconomic management combined with the
centralization of fiscal rules for macroeconomic management, was too simplistic due to
the following political context. First, under the Argentine electoral system, individuals
running for the National Congress must be included on party lists to be reelected, but
only about one in four incumbents seeking reelection in the 1989–99 period were
renominated by their parties. Since provincial power-brokers have a decisive influence
in deciding who gets listed, provincial governments have a great deal of power in the
congressional elections. Under this electoral system, the provincial governments often
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16. In relation with this, Calvo et al. (2002) state that in economies with rigid nominal domestic prices, the real
exchange rate will decline greatly until the fixed foreign exchange rate system collapses. Their hypothesis is that it
is politically difficult to decrease the government budget deficit because the private sector does not understand
this economic consequence, and thus nations put off the required structural reforms.fight over central government fiscal sources and repeated short-sighted decisions 
are possible. For example, in seven separate instances from 1992 to 1994, provincial 
governments went bankrupt, were given central government bonds by the central 
government, and sold these bonds on the market to procure additional funds. Tommasi
et al. (2001) also report cases where regional pension systems went bankrupt because
disbursements were maintained despite difficulties in collecting insurance premiums,
and the shortfalls were covered by the central government. Tommasi et al. (2001) 
say that the effectiveness of fiscal discipline is clearly not guaranteed under this type 
of political framework, and that the prescription in this case is electoral reforms to
reduce the dependency of national legislators on the local party elite, and reform of 
the instruments that legislate the interaction between the president and Congress,
which could strengthen the role of the Congress and prepare a medium- to long-term
framework for the fiscal policies of the entire government (both central and regional).
Our paper does not delve into this political background. We focus on the types 
of domestic structural adjustments required over the long term following external
economic shocks, and leave the more political aspects as topics for future research.
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This appendix presents the details of the derivation of the results presented in 
Section II.
A. Consumer’s Problem 
A representative household (hereafter consumer) maximizes his/her lifetime utility
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The first-order conditions for optimization are as follows. 
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lim 1t • bt • e
−rt = 0   (non-Ponzi game condition), 
t→ 
lim 3t • Kt • e
−rt = 0   (transversality condition). 
t→ 
Combining the market clearing conditions, the first-order conditions, and 
the terminal conditions, we obtain the following equations that characterize the 
equilibrium path: 
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T + q • G
N = T, 
rs(b) = rd. 
B. Stationary Equilibrium
Under the stationary equilibrium, equations (A.1) through (A.9) must hold (the
superscript asterisks indicate the stationary-equilibrium values): 
 U(C
T*, C
N*)             U(C
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N*) —————– =  1 *,   ————— — =  1 * • q*,   (C
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  = r(b*) ≡ rd = rs(b*), (A.2) 
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T + r(b*) • b*, (A.7)
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T + q* • G
N = T. (A.9)
Equation (A.1) shows that at the stationary equilibrium, the consumption for
both goods will be a function of  1 and q:
C
T* = C
T*( 1, q), 
C
N* = C
N*( 1, q). 
Equations (A.3) and (A.4) show that k
T, k




















These results show that the traded goods and non-tradable goods outputs will be
functions of q and K:
Y
T* = L





N*(q,K ) • h(k
N*(q)) = Y
N*(q,K ). 
Moreover, equations (A.1)–(A.9) provide us with the following useful relationships
for further analysis: 
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C. Stability of the Equilibrium 
The following five equations summarize the dynamic properties of the equilibrium
path: 
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We linearize the above five equations to obtain four linear differential equations
around the stationary equilibrium: 
 
.
1 = {  − r(b*)} 1 * −  1 * • r′(b*)(b − b*) 
+ {  − r(b*)}( 1 −  1 *) 
=− 1 * • r′(b*)(b − b*), 
51
Effects of External Debt on Domestic Resource Allocation in a Small Open Economy with Limited Access to theWorld Capital Market   k
N*  q . = {r(b*) − h′(k
N*(q*))}q* + −q*h″(k
N*(q*)) • ——q=q*(q − q*) 
  q 
+ q* • r′(b*)(b − b*) 
 f (k
T(q*))           








N*(q*, K*) − C
N*(λ1 *, q*) − G




N*   Y
N* + ——q=q*,K=K* − ——λ1=λ1 *,q=q*(q − q*) + ——q=q*,K=K*(K − K*) 




N*  =−——λ1=λ1 *,q=q*(λ1 − λ1 *) + ——q=q*,K=K* − ——λ1=λ1 *,q=q*(q − q*) 
 λ1   q  q 
 Y









T*  + ——λ1=λ1 *,q=q* − ——q=q*,K=K*(q − q*) 
  q  q 
 Y
T* − ——q=q*,K=K*(K − K*) + {r(b*) + r′(b*) • b*}(b − b*). 
 K
These equations can be compactly written in matrix notation, as follows:
 0                 0                    0                − 1 * • r′(b*)    
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(A.10)
The four characteristic roots of the Jacobian matrix of equation (A.10), hereafter
x, y, z, w, must satisfy the following equations (A.11) through (A.14): 
x + y + z +w
f (k
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= 2  + b* • r′(b*) > 0,
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The signs of equations (A.11) and (A.14) are both positive. Equation (A.12) shows
that if the following inequality holds, we get xy + xz + xw + yz + yw + zw < 0. 
h*  Y
N*  C
T*  (r(b*) + b* • r′(b*)) < ————– • ——q=q*,K=K* − λ1 * • r′(b*)——λ1=λ1 *,q=q* (k
N* − k
T*)     K  λ1
 C
T*  Y
T* + q* • r′(b*)(——λ1=λ1 *,q=q* − ——q=q*,K=K*). 
 q  q
If this inequality holds, equation (A.10) shows that the characteristic roots of the
Jacobian matrix will have two roots with positive real parts and two roots whose real
parts are negative. Note that we have two jump variables  1 and q, and two predeter-
mined variables K and b. The number of jump variables is equal to the number of 
negative roots, thus, we verify that the system equation (A.10) has saddle-point 
equilibrium. Under the assumption of the existence of saddle-point equilibrium, one 
can obtain similar solutions from the equation (A.10) following Bhandari et al. (1990).
a14  ( 2) •  K −  b  1(t) =  ** +  ( 1)— – • ——————— – exp( 1 • t)   1  ( 1) −  ( 2)
a14  b −  ( 1) •  K
(A.15)
+  ( 2)— – • —————— —– exp( 2 • t),   2  ( 1) −  ( 2)
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a 24  b −  ( 1) •  K
(A.16)
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 ( 2) •  K −  b K(t) = K** + —————–—–exp( 1 • t) 
 ( 1) −  ( 2)
 b −  ( 1) •  K
(A.17)
+ —————–—–exp( 2 • t),
 ( 1) −  ( 2)
 ( 2) •  K −  b b(t) = b** +  ( 1) • —————– —–exp( 1 • t)
 ( 1) −  ( 2)
 b −  ( 1) •  K
(A.18)
+  ( 2) • —————–—–exp( 2 • t),
 ( 1) −  ( 2)
where  1,  2 are two negative characteristic roots of the Jacobian matrix of equation
(A.10) (where  1 <  2 < 0). Let the capital stock and the outstanding external debt at
the initial stationary equilibrium and those at the new equilibrium be (K*, b*),
(K**, b**), respectively, and define  K := K** − K*,  b := b** − b*. Let 
 ( ) :=− (( 
2(−  + a22)a43( 
3a 33 −  
2a22a33 −  a 14a33a41 + a14a22a33a 41
−  a24a33a42 +  a 14a31a43 − a14a22a31a43 +  a24a32a43 −  
2a33a44
+  a22a33a44) 
((− 
4 +  
3a 22 +  
2a14a41 −  a 14a22a41 +  
2a24a42 +  
3a44 −  
2a 22a44)
( a 24(a33a42 − a32a43) − (  − a22)(a14(a33a41 − a31a43) +  a33(  − a 44))))
−1
where aij is (i, j) components of the Jacobian matrix of equation (A.10). 
Numerical examples shown in Figures 1 through 4 are simulated based on equations
(A.15) through (A.18).
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